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
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Abstract: Antitrust remedy is not exclusive to ex-ante merger control. The remedy for ex-post monopoly cases such as monopoly agreement and abuse of dominant position is not sanction or punishment, but necessary measures to effectively terminate illegal acts and eliminate the adverse effects of such acts on competition. The three core objectives of remedy for ex-post monopoly cases are to stop illegal acts, prevent illegal acts from happening again and restore market competition. Structural remedy involves the redistribution of undertakings' property rights, which aims to weaken the motivation and ability of undertakings to implement monopolistic behavior, including break-up remedy and divestiture remedy. Behavioral remedy involves the restriction of the freedom of contract and the way of exercising property rights, aiming at continuously regulating the behavior of undertakings and the transaction relations between undertakings, including conduct remedy and performance remedy. Structural remedy and behavioral remedy have potential advantages and disadvantages, and behavioral remedy is not necessarily superior to structural remedy. The legal liability provisions of the newly revised Anti-monopoly Law further deepen the problem of "emphasizing sanction and neglecting remedy", and leave systemic defects of remedy system and its legal basis applying to monopoly agreement and abuse of dominant position.

Keywords: Ex-post Monopoly Cases; Sanction; Remedy; Structural Remedy; Behavioral Remedy